Recently, a quick and simple way of creating very efficient distinguishers for cryptographic primitives such as block ciphers or hash functions, was presented and proved useful by the authors. In this paper, this cryptanalytic attack (named genetic cryptanalysis after its use of genetic algorithms) is shown to be successful when applied over reduced-round versions of the block cipher XTEA. Efficient distinguishers for XTEA are proposed for up to 4 cycles (8 rounds). Additionally, a variant of this genetic attack is also introduced, and their results over the block cipher TEA presented, which are the most powerful published to date.
w Introduction
The construction of a distinguisher ~) (i.e. an algorithm that is capable of distinguishing a random permutation or random mapping from a given cryptographic primitive such as a block cipher or hash function) is one of the objectives of any cryptanalyst.
Although a distinguisher may or may not be used to recover some of the plaintext or key bits, the existence of an efficient and effective distinguisher always means the cryptographic primitive in question is weak ~'3/ and must be discarded for any cryptographic usage.
Overview of Our Methodology
Our method, already presented in Reference, I) is based in the search for subsets of the input space that produce a high (statistically significant) deviation of the distribution of a given subset of the output produced by a given cryptographic primitive. For this search we use a genetic-algorithm based approach in which individuals of the population codify bit masks that are used to perform a logical AND with randomly generated inputs. In this way, we get an extremely efficient representation of those input subsets characterized by having some of the input bits fixed to a zero value. Input subsets of this form are evaluated performing chi-square tests over the output distribution of the subset under observation. These tests vary, because additional rounds of XTEA exponentially increase the dispersion of the output, and thus the difficulty of finding significant deviations. The genetic algorithm will evolve individuals and populations towards those that, by fixing the input bits that have a greater effect over the observed output, produce a higher deviation from the expected probability distribution.
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Results for XTEA
Below we present the results of our attempts to evolve distinguishers for reduced round variants of XTEA. We start with the simplest case (one cycle of XTEA) and progressively increase the number of rounds.
One Cycle XTEA
Every input subset (or bitmask) is tested by generating 211 random inputs, and then performing a logical AND between each of these inputs and the bitmask. Then XTEA1 (i.e. one cycle of XTEA) is applied over thus generated vectors, and the values of the least significant eight bits of the first output word of XTEA, that is w[0]&255, are computed.
We have focused in this particular part of the output because there are authors, notably, T) that have shown that block ciphers using rotation as one of their round operations (as is the case of XTEA) tend to exhibit bad distributions in their least significant bits of their output words. The fitness function we propose for the genetic algorithm is highly related with the chi-square statistic X 2 which in our case measures the deviation of the observed output distribution from uniform, in this way:
The idea behind this fitness function is that the value of the chi square statistic cannot increase indefinitely, but has a maximum. The maximum value of the chi square statistic corresponding to a distribution with 255 degrees of freedom and 211 observations is precisely 522480, which is obtained when all the possible 256 outputs collapse into a single one. Once we find bitmasks that produce this maximum deviation, our search must continue by looking for those bitmasks that are heavier (have more l's), and this is the reason of including the weight w in the formula above, once the maximum deviation is obtained. Heavier bitmasks are preferred because they allow for a larger set of different inputs, so in this sense we can say they are more general, and also give more information about the input subset (the 0's in the bitmask or inactive bits) that has a stronger influence over the observed output. Obviously, we must try to maximise this fitness value. The code we used for testing was the implementation of the genetic algorithm of William M. Spears, from the Navy Center for Applied Research. Other parameters needed for running the genetic algorithm are the size of the population, the mutation rate and the crossover probability. Those values were fixed, respectively, to 100, 0.005 and 0.85 after some trial and error testing that showed they produced good results. The best bitmask we found after around 730 generations and 34000 evaluations for the fitness function presented above was ml: {OxFFFFFF00, 0X7F7FE000, 0xFFFFFF00, 0xFFFEFFFF, 0xFEFFFBFF, 0XF 7FFFFFF}
which has a weight of 157 and produces a chi square of 522240.
It was then tested with different, previously unseen input subsets of size 211 and in every case it produced maximal deviations (i.e. a collapse of the output). This bitmask can be used to construct an exceptionally efficient and simple distinguisher for XTEA1, the pseudocode of which is presented below:
INPUT: F: Z~ 92 , > Z 64, a random mapping or XTEA1 ALGORITHM:
9 Generate a random vector v E Z 1 9 2 9 Apply the mask ml, getting v' --v&ml which can take any of 215r possible values
It is interesting to point out that this distinguisher is extremely efficient, given that with only one input text it has a false positive probability of 1/256 (or around 0.4 pet) and a zero probability of false negatives.
Two Cycles XTEA
X T E A with two cycles (XTEA2) is much harder than XTEA1. The additional cycle significantly increases the strength of the algorithm and no usable bitmaks producing maximal deviation (collapses) were found, so the fitness function used for XTEA1 is not adequate here. Although a fitness function consisting simply of the chi-square statistic can break XTEA2, it needs some extra care with technical details (mainly a selection proportional to rank and not to fitness and different mutation and crossover probabilities) to produce good results. Another drawback of this fitness function is that it shows a very low convergence towards good solutions (those which produce results statistically better than can be expected at random). Furthermore, this simplistic approximation is not applicable to XTEA3. So, after solving the case for XTEA3, we turned back to XTEA2 and observed that the same fitness function would be very adequate, so we will present now a new fitness function that reflects an idea that is enough for breaking both XTEA2 and XTEA3. The fitness function used in this case is shown below:
I f X 2 > 403.4579 then f i t n e s s = 1/W 3 -/-W 4 else f i t n e s s = 1/w 3
The idea behind this fitness function is to divide the search for good and heavy bitmasks in two phases. In the first one, the chi-square values will be around the 0.5 percentile, and the fitness function above will simply look for low-weighted bitmasks.
When the bitmasks are sufficiently low to produce high values of the chi square statistic (above the threshold of 403.4579), then the objective is to find heavier bitmasks between those which produce a very high statistical value (Table 1 shows some p-values of a chi-square distribution with 255 degrees of freedom). In this way, we do not maximize the chi-square value but the weight of the masks that produce a statistic value over a given threshold. In this case, the threshold is the corresponding value for a chi-square distribution with 255 degrees of freedom and a p-value of 5 9 10 -9, so it clearly shows a very strong deviation from randomness.
Using this approximation, we got the following bitmask rn2 after around 530 generations and 25000 evaluations: The 390.0315 is the value corresponding to a p-value of 10 -7, so the distinguisher described before will have a false positive probability of 10 -7 and a false negative probability even closer to zero.
Three Cycles XTEA
Using essentially the same approximation described before, we get the following bitmask m3 for XTEA with 3 cycles after around 1600 generations and 76000 evaluations {0xFFC7E0@8,0xF9C60000,0xFFC7E018,0xFFFFF5FA, 0xFFFFFF8A, 0xFFF6009A}
which has a weight of 118 and produces an average chi-square statistic of 530.6 over previously unseen cases. The distinguisher will be, then The 330.5197 threshold is the value corresponding to a p-value of 10 -3, so this distinguisher will have a false positive probability of 10 -3 and a false negative probability of around 0.5
Four Cycles XTEA
This is a considerably harder case. When using the same approximation that was successful over the prior two cases, we only managed to obtain bitmasks of relatively low weight. This is interesting and can be useful for different cryptanalytic purposes, for example for starting a search of impossible differentials, but it is not enough in this case, as it does not allow for 264 different inputs. When not having at least 264 different elements in the input subset, we can not ask to obtain a good distribution of the output, as it must somehow reflect the low entropy of the input (although it do not need to be precisely in w[0]&255, the bits we observe). So we need a different approximation, a subtler one, able of distinguishing from randomness behaviors that may have past undetected by other, less sensible, tests.
Our proposal is' based in a test used to measure the Strict Avalanche Criterion or SAC. s) The SAC will be measured just by flipping at random a bit that is at a position where there is an active bit (i.e. one that has a 1 in the corresponding input mask), then measuring the Hamming distance of the two outputs.
A mapping Z~ ~ ~ Zff has the SAC over a certain input subset S E Z~ iff the Hamming distance of the output of inputs x and x' that only differ in a position (i.e. w(xOx') = 1) and belong to the input subset S follow a Binomial distribution. In the case of TEA, we should have a B(1/2, 64). It is New Results on the Genetic Cryptanalysls of TEA and Reduced-round Versions
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of XTEA important to note that the satisfactibily of this criterion implies the avalanche effect (changes in the input of only one bit should produce a change of around half of the output), because the average of the distribution B(1/2, n) is n/2. For testing if a given bitmask represents an input subset which elements meet the SAC, we propose to perform a chi-square test for the goodness of fit of the observed output distribution of the Hamming values with respect to the theoretical Binomial distribution. In this case, we have a chi square statistic with 64 degrees of freedom. Table 2 shows some p-values of this distribution. {0xCC614648, 0x22300132, 0xFB00A571, 0x32000011, 0xF40008CI, 0x17701000}
with a weight of 57 (the weight is not a limit here, as far as sufficiently many input elements exist to perform the test), a fitness of 313.06 and an average chisquare value over previously unseen examples of 278.87. In this case, we did not introduced any preference for heavier bitmasks. The corresponding distinguisher pseudocode will then be: where 148.3564 is the threshold value corresponding to a p-value of 10 -8. The distinguisher will, then, have a false positive probability of 10 -s and a negligible false negative probability.
w Improved Attack on TEA Continuing with our research in the genetic cryptanalysis of TEA, while using essentially the same approach presented in Reference 1) and in this paper, we had also tried to find characteristics (bitmasks) that produce a significative deviation of the observed output by XORing them with the inputs, instead of ANDing them as described earlier. This approach strongly resembles what we could call a genetic implementation of the differential attack, 9) or a genetic search for impossible differentials in the vein of Reference, ~ and has lead us to a very interesting result. We have found two characteristics Cl, c2 in TEA that make that any two keys k, k' with the given characteristic ci (i.e. k@k ~ = c~) produce exactly the same output, no matter how many TEA rounds are used.
These characteristics are:
C 1 : {0xS0000000, 0X80000000, 0X00000000, 0X00000000} and c2 = {OxO0000000, OxO0000000, Ox80000000, Ox80000000}
So if we generate any key at random, say 
and, in particular, this happens with the full 32 rounds recommended by the authors. This is a surprising powerful result, as normally characteristics are discovered for a certain number of rounds and then they vanish exponentially as the number of rounds increases.
w Conclusion
We have presented a cryptanalytic attack over reduced round versions of the block cipher XTEA based in the new method of constructing distinguishers for cryptographic mappings proposed at Reference. 1)
We have also shown that XTEA is weak with four or less cycles, that is to say, with 8 rounds or less. This is a result quite similar to those obtained for TEA applying the same genetic cryptanalysis, which forces us to conclude that, of XTEA at least from the genetic cryptanalysis point of view, both TEA and XTEA have a very close security level.
This could also be interpreted as saying that the improvements introduced in XTEA for avoiding the attack presented in Reference ~) are limited to make this related-key attack impracticable, but do not improve the overall security of the cipher, which rest very similar to that of TEA.
Although we acknowledge that previous works, specially Reference c) have shown that both TEA and XTEA cannot be considered as secure block ciphers, and have presented stronger attacks on them, we still think the proposed approach remains valuable because it is one of the firsts published attacks using AI techniques that is able of producing worthy cryptanalytic results when confronted against modern ciphers.
Furthermore, nowadays the most powerful attack on these ciphers extend, respectively, to 10 and 12 rounds, and the approach proposed here could be extended to 8 rounds, which makes these results far from trivial and pretty close to the most powerful ones.
Additionally, and regarding the improved attack on TEA presented in this paper, it is, as far as we know, the most powerful attack presented to date against the block cipher.
It is obviously a serious weakness which concrete implications, for example it reduces the effective key-length to 126 bits, and could being straightforwardly used to construct very efficient blackbox distinguishers. This equivalent-keys weakness is not present, at least to the best of our knowledge, in XTEA.
In fact, as one could expect, some minor changes to the TEA round function could avoid it. For example, if we substitute the original line of code (1) by (1') then the problem remains, but when substituting any of them by, for example (2) The reason for this is the fact that in 32-bit implementations, operations are made, naturally, rood 232 and for that reason, both addition rood 232 and xor behave identically on the most significant bit, thus producing the undesirable effect of essentially converting (1) in (3) for the leading bit, allowing it to cancelate when simultaneously changing it in a=k[0] and b=k [1] (or, analogously, at c=k [2] and d=k [3] ).
This result is similar to a previously published result ~ where the authors presented three attacks on TEA, the first of which is based in simultaneously flipping the next most significant bits (bit 30) of k [2] and k [3] , the second based in changing the values of both k [1] (for k[1]@231@231) and v [1] (for v[1]@231 ). Both attacks, although similar to the proposed one, failed to exhibit full round characteristics.
